This note proposes various axiomatizations of contingency logic under neighborhood semantics. In particular, by defining a suitable canonical neighborhood function, we give sound and complete axiomatizations of monotone contingency logic and regular contingency logic, thereby answering two open questions raised by Bakhtiari, van Ditmarsch, and Hansen. The canonical function is inspired by a function proposed by Kuhn in 1995. We show that Kuhn's function is actually equal to a related function originally given by Humberstone.
Introduction
Compared to normal modal logics, non-normal modal logics usually have many disadvantages, such as weak expressivity, weak frame definability, which leads to nontriviality of axiomatizations. Contingency logic is such a logic [13, 3, 9, 11, 15, 8] .
Since it was independently proposed by Scott and Montague in 1970 [14, 12] , neighborhood semantics has been a standard semantical tool for handling non-normal modal logics [2] .
A neighborhood semantics of contingency logic is proposed in [5] . According to the interpretation, a formula ϕ is noncontingent, if and only if the proposition expressed by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state, or the complement of the proposition expressed by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state. This interpretation is in line with the philosophical intuition of noncontingency, viz. necessarily true or necessarily false. It is shown that contingency logic is less expressive than standard modal logic over various neighborhood model classes, and many neighborhood frame properties are undefinable in contingency logic. This brings about the difficulties in axiomatizing this logic over various neighborhood frames.
To our knowledge, only the classical contingency logic, i.e. the minimal system of contingency logic under neighborhood semantics, is presented in the literature [5] .
It is left as two open questions in [1] what the axiomatizations of monotone contingency logic and regular contingency logic are. In this paper, we will answer these two questions.
Besides, we also propose other proof systems up to the minimal contingency logic, and show their completeness with respect to the corresponding neighborhood frames. This will give a complete diagram which includes 8 systems, as [2, Fig. 8 .1] did for standard modal logic.
The remainder of this note is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces some basics of contingency logic, such as its language, neighborhood semantics, axioms and rules. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the completeness of proof systems mentioned in Sec. 2, with or without a special axiom. The completeness proofs rely on the use of canonical neighborhood functions. In Sec. 3, a simple canonical function is needed, while in Sec. 4 we need a more complex canonical function, which is inspired by a crucial function λ used in a Kripke completeness proof in the literature. We further reflect on this λ in Section 5, and show it is in fact equal to a related but complicated function originally given by Humberstone. We conclude with some discussions in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Throughout this note, we fix P to be a denumerable set of propositional variables. The language L(∆) of contingency logic is defined recursively as follows:
∆ϕ is read "it is non-contingent that ϕ". The contingency operator ∇ abbreviates ¬∆. It does not matter which one of ∆ and ∇ is taken as primitive.
The neighborhood semantics of L(∆) is interpreted on neighborhood models. To say a triple M = S, N, V is a neighborhood model, if S is a nonempty set of states, N : S → P(P(S)) is a neighborhood function, and V is a valuation.
The following list of neighborhood properties is taken from [5, Def. 3] .
of ϕ (i.e. the proposition expressed by ϕ) in M.
Our discussions will be based on the following axioms and rules.
TAUT all instances of tautologies
We will show that the following systems are sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of their corresponding frame classes. systems frame classes
Given a system Λ and a maximal consistent set S c for Λ, let |ϕ| Λ be the proof set of ϕ in Λ; in symbol, |ϕ| Λ = {s ∈ S c | ϕ ∈ s}. It is easy to show that |¬ϕ| Λ = S c \|ϕ| Λ . We always omit the subscript Λ when it is clear from the context.
3 Systems excluding ∆M Given a proof system, a standard method of showing its completeness under neighborhood semantics is constructing the canonical neighborhood model, where one essential part is the definition of canonical neighborhood function. In what follows, we will extend the canonical model construction to all systems excluding ∆M listed above.
It is not hard to show that ∆C is invalid on the class of all (i)-frames, and thus (EC) ∆ is not sound (and strongly complete) with respect to the class of all frames satisfying (i). Despite this, it is indeed sound and strongly complete with respect to a more restricted frame class. Proof. By Thm. 3, it suffices to show that ∆C is valid on (i)&(c)-frames, and that N c possesses (i) and (c). The former follows from the fact that ∆C is valid on the class of (i)&(c)-frames under a new semantics proposed in [4] and that on (c)-frames, the current semantics and the new semantics satisfies the same formulas.
As for the latter, ∆Equ guarantees (c), and ∆C provides (i).
Theorem 5. (EN) ∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all frames satisfying (n).
Proof. It suffices to show that N c possesses the property (n). This is immediate due to ∆N and the definition of N c .
By Thm. 4 and Thm. 5, we obtain the following result. 
Systems including ∆M
In this section, we show that the systems including ∆M listed above are sound and strongly complete with respect to the corresponding frame classes. We first consider the system M ∆ . The following result tells us that M ∆ is sound with respect to the class of frames satisfying (s).
Proposition 7. ∆M is valid on the class of frames satisfying (s).
For the completeness, we construct the canonical neighborhood model for M ∆ , where the crucial definition is the canonical neighborhood function. The definition of N c below is inspired by a function λ introduced in [11 
We need to show that N c is well-defined. Note that M c is not necessarily supplemented. Thus we need to define a notion of supplementation, which comes from [2] . 
It is easy to see that M + is supplemented. Moreover, N (s) ⊆ N + (s). The proof below is a routine work. '=⇒': Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (N c ) + (s), to show that ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ. By supposition, X ⊆ |ϕ| for some X ∈ N c (s). Then there is a χ such that |χ| = X, and thus ∆(χ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for every ψ, in particular With a routine work, we obtain Theorem 15. M ∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of frames satisfying (s).
We are now in a position to deal with the sound and strong completeness of R ∆ . First, the soundness follows from the following result. It is straightforward to obtain the following result.
Theorem 21. K ∆ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of filters.
By constructing countermodels, we can obtain the following cube, which summarizes the deductive powers of the systems in this paper. An arrow from a system S 1 to another S 2 means that S 2 is deductively stronger than S 1 .
5 Reflection: how does the function λ arise?
As noted, in order to show the completeness of proof systems including ∆M, a crucial part is to define a suitable canonical function, i.e. N c , which is inspired by the function λ in [11] . The λ is very important for the definition of canonical relation and thus for the completeness proof in the cited paper. It is this function that helps find simple axiomatizations for the minimal contingency logic and transitive contingency logic under Kripke semantics, so to speak. Despite its importance, the author did not say any intuitive idea about λ. And this function was thought of as 'ingenious' creation by some other researchers, say Humberstone The reason for defining the function λ in such a way, is that the author would like to 'simulate' the canonical relation of the minimal modal logic, which is defined via xRy iff λ(x) ⊆ y, where λ(x) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ x}. This can be seen from several passages:
The intuitive idea is that for x ∈ W , λ(x) is the set of formulas which are necessary at x.
· · ·
The idea of the entry condition on A, that only such A (with ∆A ∈ x) should be labeled as Necessary if all their consequences are non-contingent, is that · · · , those non-contingencies which qualify as such because they, rather than their negations, are necessary and have only non-contingent consequences, since those consequences are themselves necessary. [9, p. 219] Then the function λ was simplified, and accordingly, the completeness proof was simplified in [11] . There, λ(x), denoted by K's λ, is defined as:
In the sequel, we will demonstrate that, in fact, K's λ is equal to H's λ.
To begin with, notice that ⊢ ϕ → ϕ, thus the part following 'and' in the H's λ definition entails ∆ϕ ∈ x. Therefore, the H's λ(x) is equal to a simplified version:
Then it is sufficient to show that the simplified λ is further equal to K's λ, even in the setting of arbitrary neighborhood contingency logics (as opposed to Kripke contingency logics).
Proposition 22. Let x be a maximal consistent set. Given the rule RE∆, the following statements are equivalent. 3 (1) For every ψ such that ⊢ ϕ → ψ, ∆ψ ∈ x.
(2) For every ψ, ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x.
Proof. (1) =⇒ (2): suppose (1) holds. Since ⊢ ϕ → ϕ ∨ ψ, then it is immediate by (1) that ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x, namely (2).
(2) =⇒ (1): suppose (2) holds, to show (1) . For this, assume that ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ ↔ ψ, by RE∆, ⊢ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ↔ ∆ψ. By (2), we obtain that ∆ψ ∈ x, as desired.
Concluding Discussions
In this note, by defining suitable neighborhood canonical functions, we presented a sequence of contingency logics under neighborhood semantics. In particular, inspired by Kuhn's function λ in [11] , we defined a desired canonical neighborhood function, and then axiomatized monotone contingency logic and regular contingency logic and other logics including the axiom ∆M, thereby answering two open questions raised in [1] . We then reflected on the function λ, and showed that it is actually equal to Humberstone's function λ in [9] , even in the setting of arbitrary neighborhood contingency logics.
Moreover, as we observe, in M ∆ , ∆M can be replaced by ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨ ∆(¬ϕ → χ), and in R ∆ , ∆C can be replaced by ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧ ∆(¬ψ → ϕ) → ∆ϕ. 4 Thus we can also adopt these two alternative formulas to axiomatize monotone contingency logic and regular contingency logic. Therefore, it was wrong to claim that "one cannot fill these gaps with the axioms ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ → ψ) ∨ ∆(¬ϕ → χ) and ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∧ ∆(¬ψ → ϕ) → ∆ϕ" on [1, p. 62] .
Recall that an 'almost definability' schema, ∇χ → ( ϕ ↔ (∆ϕ ∧ ∆(χ → ϕ))), is proposed in [7] , and shown in [8] to be applied to axiomatize contingency logic over much more Kripke frame classes than Kuhn's function λ and other variations. Therefore, it may be natural to ask if the schema can also work in the neighborhood setting. The canonical neighborhood function inspired by the schema seems to be N (s) = {|ϕ| | ∆ϕ ∧ ∆(ψ → ϕ) ∈ s for some ∇ψ ∈ s}.
Unfortunately the answer seems to be negative. The reason can be explained as follows. Although N c in Def. 8 is almost monotonic in the sense that if |ϕ| ∈ N c (s) and |ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|, then |ψ| ∈ N c (s), as can be easily seen from the proof of Lemma 13, in contrast, as one may easily verify, N is not almost monotonic in the above sense, i.e., it fails that if |ϕ| ∈ N (s) and |ϕ| ⊆ |ψ|, then |ψ| ∈ N (s). This can also explain why N c works well for monotone and regular contingency logics and other logics including the axiom ∆M. Despite this fact, this N c does not apply to systems excluding the axiom ∆M, since we need this axiom to ensure the truth lemma (Lemma 10). It is also worth noting that this N c is smaller than that in the case of classical contingency logic (Def. 2), thus we cannot address all neighborhood contingency logics in a unified way. 5 This indicates that the completeness proofs of these logics are nontrivial. Besides, N c seems not workable for proper extensions of K ∆ , which we leave for future work.
